Introduction: Beyond the Nominalism-Realism Divide: Objective Fictions from Bentham through Marx to Lacan

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WHEN IT COMES to questions of objectivity in current philosophical debates and public discourse, we are witnessing the re-emergence and growing importance of two classical, opposed approaches: nominalism and (metaphysical) realism. Today's nominalist stances, by absolutising intersubjectivity, are moving towards the abandonment of the very notion of truth and objective reality. By contrast, today's realist positions, including those bound up with scientific discourse, insist on the category of the 'object-in-itself' as irreducible to any kind of subjective mediation. However, despite their apparent mutual exclusivity, both nominalism and realism, paradoxically yet not surprisingly, coincide regarding one point: they both imply an absolute and clean separation between the domains of objectivity and subjectivity, between the 'object-in-itself' and subjective mediation, and, ultimately, between truth and fiction.

From the point of view of the history of philosophy, it could be said that the opposition between nominalism and (metaphysical) realism can be – at least to some extent – traced back to the very origins of philosophy. If a necessary condition of the Platonic theory of Ideas as ideal forms was the exit from the cave as the realm of shadows, this very same exit actually laid the ground for the classical metaphysical distinction between two neatly separated words, namely that of appearances and that of truth/essence. Whether the main achievement of Plato's allegory of the cave was to provide the concept of Idea/truth, or the invention of fiction – in the sense that the Idea constitutes the very measure with respect to which we are able to recognise the fictitious world of the cave's shadows as fictitious – is of secondary importance. What is probably most interesting is that Socrates was, in fact, the first philosophical 'victim' of the opposition he set up. As Mladen Dolar shows in his essay in this volume, Socrates may well be the most ferocious advocate of truth, yet this did not

prevent him from being convicted on the basis of rumours and gossip, which are by definition without any precise (subjective) bearer – 'the rumour has IT', as Dolar puts it, referring to the Freudian impersonal speech of the unconscious. Yet, as the case of Socrates's trial shows, fictitious entities like rumours and gossip, despite them being fictions in the sense that they do not claim to refer to factual truth (rumour is a rumour), they nevertheless have the objective status of elements that truly structure the existing reality; to some extent they are even the products of this same reality. This is why they deserve to be called *objective fictions*. As such, they are perhaps even more true than the truth of the gods of metaphysics, if we consider their fatal consequences for Socrates.

Despite this poignant reminder of the high price that philosophy paid for ignoring the power of objective fictions, contemporary nominalist and realist trends both seem to continue to ignore it – and, hence, to repress the fundamental deadlock traversing their own past rather than addressing it.

Differently from these prevailing trends which presuppose a clear-cut distinction between objectivity (object, truth) and subjectivity (subject, fiction), or else aim at abandoning this distinction altogether and declaring everything that takes place as 'objective', the main conceptual figure of this volume is *objective fiction*. This figure does not simply blur the lines between the two categories, but draws our attention to the antagonistic, *contradictory* character of objective reality itself as something objective.

Thus the term 'objective fiction' refers not only to fictions and similar phenomena, which constitute the necessary integral parts of either forms of knowledge or objective reality, parts without which this very same knowledge or reality would disintegrate. More importantly, this term also refers to fictions that are the products of this objective reality itself. Recall the Marxist concept of 'commodity fetishism' or, on a different level, Lacan's definition of the big Other (*qua* symbolic order) as that 'which has a body and does not exist':[1] these fantasmic entities are not simply subjective illusions nor subjective mediations, but constitute the core of the structure of objective *and* subjective reality themselves, their short-circuit. This means that these entities are the effects of a negativity – contradictions and gaps – within reality itself, and one cannot simply remove them from reality without the latter disintegrating.

The structure of objective fictions is articulated and elaborated in this volume by relying mainly on those *materialist* theoretical traditions (Marxism and psychoanalysis *in primis*) which never accepted the straightforward distinction between the spheres of subjectivity and objectivity, or between fiction and truth, but instead prioritised the concepts of *universality* and *contradiction* as *sublations* of both domains. As such, these traditions are irreducible to the nominalism–realism divide. This

perhaps might be regarded as a crucial distinctive feature of a truly materialist concept: in prioritising the structural paradoxes or contradictions of objective reality (of which the subject and subjective as well as the fictitious and fictional are integral parts), a sharp distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as between truth and fiction, is simply inoperative.

In the remainder of this introduction, we will try to outline the basic structure and logic of objective fiction via a discussion triangulating three thinkers: Marx, Lacan and Bentham. Indeed, as will become apparent in a moment, Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* not only foreshadows core features of this volume's conceptual leitmotif (i.e. objective fictions). Benthamite philosophy also surprisingly establishes core connections between both Marxist and Lacanian approaches to the topic of fictions, with these two orientations being central for the chapters to follow here.

In fact – and to be more precise – Lacan functions as a marriage broker bringing together the odd couple of Bentham *avec* Marx. What makes this Lacan-facilitated rapprochement between Bentham and Marx odd (i.e. surprising) is Marx's scathing hostility towards Bentham's utilitarianism, with its philosophical (mis)treatments of socio-economic, political and legal phenomena.

Two mentions of Bentham in the first volume of *Das Kapital* succinctly and powerfully convey Marx's acidic scorn for Benthamite utilitarianism. Marx, at the end of Part Two ('The Transformation of Money into Capital') of his 1867 *magnum opus*, famously inserts Bentham's name into a sarcastic characterisation of capitalism's marketplaces, including its job markets. Bentham enjoys the dubious honour of being both the only proper name and the last term of the series consisting of the preceding terms 'Freedom, Equality, Property . . .'[2] Marx treats Bentham's name as synonymous with the horrifically pitiless selfishness of Dickensian England.

Later in *Capital, Volume One*, a long footnote contained in Chapter Twenty-Four heaps derision on Bentham's head.[3] Marx dismisses Benthamite utilitarianism as a crude ideological false naturalisation of the capitalist interests peculiar to modern industrialism. At the end of this lambasting of Bentham, Marx concludes, 'I should call Mr. Jeremy a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity.'[4] Bentham ingeniously, although unintentionally, lays bare the mindlessly brutal greed of industrial England's ruling class.

Yet, despite Marx's pronounced aversion to Bentham, Lacan's psychoanalytic reflections on the latter's 1813–15 *Theory of Fictions* disclose an unexpected cross-resonance between Marx and Bentham. Specifically, Lacan enables a link to be established between Benthamite 'fictions' (about which more will be said shortly) and Marxian 'real abstractions'. Although the phrase 'real abstractions' typically is credited to Alfred Sohn-Rethel,[5] it nicely captures a motif readily discernible in Marx's own writings.[6] This motif is nothing other than what Žižek, in his contribution

opening this volume, labels 'Marx's Theory of Fictions', a title fortuitously calling to mind Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* (and, in 1993's *Tarrying with the Negative*, Žižek provides a lucid examination of Lacan's reading of this Bentham[7]).

Borrowing a phrase from Hegel's *Science of Logic*, one fairly could say that capitalism in its virtual entirety is, for Marx, a 'realm of shadows'.[8] Or, in still more Hegelian language that Marx himself deploys, the capitalist universe is an 'inverted world' (*verkehrte Welt*). In this topsy-turvy place where seemingly everything is upside-down, subjectivity appears in the guise of objectivity (through the 'thingification' [*Verdinglichkung*] of reification), objectivity appears in the guise of subjectivity (via the fetishisms of capital and commodities treating lifeless things, instead of labouring subjects, as the active agents of the capitalist mode of production) and, in general, various fictions replace realities.

However, these Marxian fictions are limited neither to illusory-*qua*-epiphenomenal surface appearances, as the hollow lies of capitalism's ideologies, nor to the epistemology of the historical materialist analysis of capitalism, with the abstract theoretical categories of its critique of political economy. That is to say, these fictions are not mere matters of ideological and/or critical thinking (along the lines of a strict separation between thinking and being). Rather, they are concrete components integral to the very being of capitalist reality in and of itself. They must be recognised as part and parcel of the inventory of the social ontology of capitalism.

Within the capitalist socio-economic system, relations between persons really are (and do not just seem to be) reduced to relations between things; labour really does become abstract in the form of available, fungible, de-skilled bodies with nothing but quantities of purchasable time; individuals really are reduced to the status of simple bearers (*Träger*) or personifications of trans-individual class roles; and inhuman circuits of capital flows really do escape from control by those conjuring with them. In short, such abstractions as are involved with fetishism, reification, alienation and the like are all-too-real aspects of life under capitalism. Hence they are real abstractions. Or, as per the title of the present volume, these ideological and theoretical fictions are (also) 'objective fictions'. As Lacan would put it, these fictions have legs; they march in the streets (*à la* Lacan's pointed rebuttal of the May '68 slogan 'Structures don't march in the streets').[9] Capitalism's fictions walk among us, sometimes even walking about as us, with them impersonating us and/ or us impersonating them.

But what about Lacan and the connection he makes possible between Marx and Bentham? At this juncture, a selective parsing of Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* is requisite before turning to Lacan's comments on this work. In line with the prevailing sensibilities of early-modern British philosophy, Bentham adheres to a specific constellation of philosophical positions. His utilitarianism, encompassing ethics,

politics and law, is bound up with an empiricist epistemology as well as a nominalist ontology. An awareness of Bentham's combination of utilitarianism, at the level of practical philosophy, with both empiricism and nominalism, at the level of theoretical philosophy, is necessary for an appreciation of the contents of his *Theory of Fictions*.

Lacan repeatedly stresses that the Benthamite notion of the fictitious is inseparable from and indispensable to utilitarianism.[10] He portrays Bentham as pushing utilitarianism to 'its logical extreme',[11] including in *Theory of Fictions* specifically.[12] However, Lacan's remarks here aside – they will come up again below – the likely initial impression for a first-time reader of *Theory of Fictions*, especially one unfamiliar with the rest of Bentham's corpus, is of a doctrine pushing nominalism to its logical extreme.

For Bentham's hyper-nominalist ontology, the domain of true reality is extremely small and restricted. Only tangible 'substances' perceived in the (supposed) immediacy of the here and now as individuated objects of the senses are deemed by Bentham to be 'real entities'. The vastly wider scope of everything else presumably under the sun would be, in one way or another, fictitious.

A perusal of Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* reveals that, for the author, any general concept, category, class or set over and above nominalism's sensory-perceptual particulars counts as a 'fiction'. Hence a far-from-exhaustive list of Benthamite fictional entities would include: qualities distinct from and predicable of a plurality of particular substances;[13] time as the omnipresent milieu of all unique happenings;[14] existence as the universal status of any and all beings as merely existing;[15] modal categories (possibility, necessity, contingency, etc.);[16] nature as designating the entirety of the physical universe;[17] common nouns grouping together innumerable individuals; prescriptive/normative terms for values, principles, ideals and the like; and anything else that is not an individuated sensible thing perceived by conscious experience in the *hic et nunc*. Bentham's strict adherence to nominalism compels him to broaden the notion of the fictitious to cover a mind-bogglingly wide range of topics.

Given the dizzying array of fictional entities in Bentham's *Theory of Fictions*, one already senses that Bentham cannot conflate the fictitious in his broad meaning with the deceptive. Indeed, he explicitly notes that far from all fictions in his sense are deceptions.[18] Lacan underscores this point in his comments on Bentham's account of the fictional.[19]

Early on in *Theory of Fictions*, Bentham tightly tethers the fictitious to the linguistic. Perhaps not by coincidence, it is a linguist, the great structuralist Roman Jakobson no less, who alerts Lacan to Bentham's *Theory of Fictions*.[20] Bentham, in line with his nominalism, asserts that, 'To language, then – to language alone – it is, that fictitious entities owe their existence; their impossible, yet indispensable,

existence.'[21] He subsequently characterises the fictitious as 'a necessary resource'.[22] Even later, Bentham maintains:

> By *fictitious entities* are here meant, not any of those which will be presented by the name of *fabulous*, i.e. imaginary *persons*, such as *Heathen Gods*, *Genii*, and *Fairies*, but such as *quality – property* (in the sense in which it is nearly synonymous to *quality*), *relation*, *power*, *obligation*, *duty*, *right*, and so forth. Incorrect as it would be if the entities in question were considered as being, in point of reality, upon a footing with *real* entities . . . the supposition of a sort of *verbal* reality, so to speak, as belonging to these fictitious entities is a supposition without which the matter of language could never have been formed, nor between man and man any converse carried on other than such as hath place between brute and brute.[23]

Bentham's distinction between the fictitious and the fabulous neatly maps onto Lacan's distinction between the Symbolic and the Imaginary respectively.[24] From the (problematic) perspective of a hard-nosed, unromantic utilitarian, it would seem that humanity could very well do without the fabulous-Imaginary. Such unreal products of the picture-thinking of daydreaming, fantasising, etc. ostensibly lack the sort of concrete use-value (i.e. 'utility') privileged by utilitarianism's cold calculations of costs and benefits. These creations of the imagination would be nothing more than whimsical frippery played with by children and artists. Yet, even prior to the advent of psychoanalysis and its crucial contributions to a critical reassessment of the fiction-reality contrast, the classical Marxist theory of ideology already suggests that fabulous entities are not without their significant usefulness for established realities (in the case of historical materialism, economically based social orders).

In relation to what is conveyed by Bentham in the preceding block quotation, Lacan latches onto the idea of the '*verbal* reality' of fictional (as distinction from fabulous) entities.[25] Following Bentham's tethering of the fictional to the linguistic, Lacan observes that Benthamite fictions are to be situated 'at the level of the signifier'.[26] Again, Bentham's fictional entities should be located within the Lacanian register of the Symbolic. Just as Lacan identifies properly human subjects as 'speaking beings' (*parlêtres*), with socio-symbolic mediation constitutive of humanity as different-in-kind from animality, so too does Bentham already propose that the '*verbal* reality' of languages' fictional entities transforms the voiceless, grunting animal (i.e. 'brute') into the loquacious, gregarious human (i.e. 'man').

Midway through the passage just quoted from *Theory of Fictions*, Bentham further nuances matters by indicating that the fictional shares features with both the fabulous and the real. Like fabulous entities, fictional entities are unreal measured

against nominalism's (restrictive) standard of reality. But, like real entities, fictional entities are invaluable and irreplaceable for the practical tasks of navigating both natural and social realities. As seen, Bentham insists on linguistic fictions' 'impossible, yet indispensable, existence' and them being 'a necessary resource'. Later on in *Theory of Fictions*, when addressing political and legal entitlements and obligations, he describes the fictitious entity 'right' as 'a fiction so necessary that without it human discourse could not be carried on'.[27] Bentham's 'discourse' arguably is cognate with the later Lacan's '*discours*' as designating not just language and linguistic intercourse, but the 'social links' (*liens sociaux*) of institutions, practices and relationships with which languages are inextricably intertwined.[28]

Fiction-facilitated practicalities, especially of a social sort, are precisely what Bentham's utilitarianism prioritises. In the same preceding quotation, over half the examples Bentham gives for fictitious entities (i.e. '*power*, *obligation*, *duty*, *right*') pertain to state and juridical domains. Indeed, Bentham's initial impetus for composing his *Theory of Fictions* comes from his consideration of 'legal fictions' specifically.[29] Thus the Lacanian emphasis on the strong bond between utility and fiction for Bentham is quite justified. Relatedly, as Lacan's favourite book,[30] Oscar Bloch and Walther von Wartburg's *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*, documents, the French word '*jouissance*' carries with it the legal connotation of a property owner's right to use what he/she owns.[31] Lacan explicitly invokes this strand of the etymology of *jouissance*, enjoyment *qua* usufruct, as involved in his own metapsychological employment of this word.[32]

In *Seminar XI* (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (1964)), Lacan mentions in passing that Freud himself, in both his theory and practice, relies on constructs akin to fictions *à la* Bentham.[33] Lacan has in mind specific moments in Freud's later work. In 1933's *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Freud confesses:

> The theory of the instincts [*Die Trieblehre*] is so to say our mythology [*unsere Mythologie*]. Instincts [*Die Triebe*] are mythical entities [*mythische Wesen*], magnificent in their indefiniteness [*Unbestimmtheit*]. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly.[34]

Contemporaneous with this confession, Freud, in a letter to Albert Einstein, writes:

> It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind of mythology [*eine Art von Mythologie*] . . . But does not every science [*Naturwissenschaft*] come in the end to a kind of mythology like this? Cannot the same be said to-day of your own Physics?[35]

And, in 1937's 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', he portrays analytic meta-psychology in its entirety as a 'witch', quoting from Part One, Scene Six of Goethe's *Faust* in so doing ('We must call the Witch to our help after all!'):

> We can only say: 'So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!' – the Witch Metapsychology [*Die Hexe Metapsychologie nämlich*]. Without metapsychological speculation and theorizing – I had almost said 'phantasying' [*Phantasieren*] – we shall not get another step forward.[36]

Central aspects of what one could call 'Freud's Theory of Fictions' are on full display in these quoted remarks. He goes so far as to depict metapsychology as a whole, the overarching conceptual framework for all of psychoanalysis including its clinical labours, as a system of speculative fantasies or theoretical mythologies, namely a network of fictions.

Yet, in a likely unintended and tacit echoing of Bentham's *Theory of Fictions*, this same Freud emphasises the unavoidability and indispensability of these speculative fantasies for both the theory and practice of analysis. Hence Freud's metapsychological concepts are fictitious entities in Bentham's precise sense (i.e. as neither fabulous nor real entities). Furthermore, Bentham almost certainly would concur with Freud when the latter surmises that even the most rigorous empirical, experimental sciences of nature, such as the mathematised physics epitomised by Einstein himself with its hypothetical formal models, themselves are built up on the basis of fictional entities serving as grounding categories and concepts for these disciplines (apropos modern natural science, recall that Bentham treats time, nature, etc. as fictional entities). Finally, in good Benthamite fashion, Freud foregrounds the precious utility of his metapsychological fictions, his foundational analytic mythologies and fantasies.

The immediately preceding risks prompting one to conclude that, for Freud, 'the Witch Metapsychology' is theoretically legitimate and practically necessary only at the subjective-epistemological level of the theorising and practising analyst. However, as witnessed above with respect to Marx, the fictitious entities of the historical materialist critique of (capitalist) political economy are not just intellectual abstractions at the epistemological level of thinking, but also are real abstractions at the ontological level of being. Likewise, in the case of Freud, the fictitious entities of psychoanalytic metapsychology are as much woven into the concrete lived existences of analysands and all human subjects (*qua parlêtres*) as they are baked into the reflections of those subjects who happen to be analytic thinkers and clinicians. As with Marx's fictions, so too with Freud's: they are objective-ontological-real, not merely subjective-epistemological-ideal, fictions.

Lacan implicitly makes this same point about the objectivity of Freudian fictitious entities in another of his glosses on Bentham. In *Seminar XX* (*Encore* (1972–73)), he employs his psychoanalytic appropriation of Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* to argue that subjects as such (i.e. as speaking beings enmeshed in the social links of discourses) utilise the fictitious entities that are the signifiers of the socio-linguistic symbolic order as means to the end of *jouissance*.[37] Combining the Lacanian renditions of both Bentham and Marx, one could say that, for this Lacan, the utility of signifiers resides in their *jouissance*-value.

Another issue Lacan raises with respect to Bentham's *Theory of Fictions* involves bringing this Bentham into connection with one of Lacan's central psychoanalytic theses. In both *Seminar VII* (*The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (1959–60)) and *Seminar XVI* (*From an Other to the other* (1968–69)),[38] he ties the fictitious as per Benthamite utilitarianism to his one-liner according to which, 'every truth has the structure of fiction' (*toute vérité a une structure de fiction*).[39] In the '*verbal* reality' of the analysand's free-associational monologues, the core truths of the unconscious usually reveal themselves in the form of fictions. Unconscious truth articulates itself in the intricately configured language of dreams, fantasies and lies, among other phenomena constituting familiar parts of the day-to-day details of the analyst's clinical work.

The present volume could be encapsulated with a complementary inversion of Lacan's aphorism having it that 'truth has the structure of fiction': fiction has the structure of truth. More precisely, objective fictions organise and sustain what is taken to be reality in all its nitty-gritty concreteness. As already indicated above, and as will be amply illustrated throughout the contributions to this volume (contributions addressing such figures as Kant (Greene), Nietzsche (Bunta), Wittgenstein (Livingston), Koyré (Tomšič, Ruda) and Badiou (Klepec) in addition to Bentham, Hegel, Marx, Freud (Troha) and Lacan), these fictions come in an array of guises: not only dreams, fantasies and lies but also artistic and cultural products, commodity and sexual fetishes (Johnston), games of myriad sorts (Holmes), unverified but always circulating rumours impacting our lives (Dolar), the rhetorical manipulations of sophistry (Klepec), values both economic and ethical (Nedoh), and even the conspiracy theories proliferating in today's all-too-non-epiphenomenal virtual reality of social media (Zupančič), among other subjects.

As per Bentham's hyper-nominalism and its linkages to Marxian real abstractions via Lacan's commentaries on the *Theory of Fictions*, very little of what human beings count as 'reality' is free of fictions. In fact, quite the contrary – the fictitious makes up the vast bulk of what we inhabit as the concretely real. In the standard, commonsensical impression of the fiction-reality pair, the fictitious is taken to be subjective and marginal by comparison with the real as objective and central. This volume reveals that the exact opposite is actually the case.

At the heart of Hegel's philosophy lies a well-known intellectual sensibility: when an established conceptual opposition oscillates, when its poles reverse positions and/or blur into each other, this opposition needs to be overcome in the manner of a sublation (*Aufhebung*). The opposition between metaphysical realism and nominalism originates with the ancient Greeks, becomes central to the Medievals and continues on through modernity up until today. But, combining the just-mentioned Hegelian sensibility with the Bentham–Marx–Lacan triangulation as laid out in the preceding, the opposition between metaphysical realism and nominalism is ripe for a renewed effort at being sublated after Hegel's own attempts to sublate it.

Bentham's pushing of nominalism to its extremes results in a theory to the effect that the realities of human knowledge, institutions and relationships are shot through with fictions indispensable for all theory and practice. The Benthamite-utilitarian real world in all its tangible weight is what it is thanks to the shining through within it of ideal beings (i.e. fictitious entities) existing and accessible only in and through linguistic and conceptual mediums. Portrayed thusly, Bentham, with his *Theory of Fictions*, unwittingly brings about the dialectical coincidence of the opposites of nominalism and metaphysical realism – with the latter's classical Platonic allegory of the cave, theory of forms/ideas and doctrine of participation being uncannily and inadvertently echoed in Bentham's hyper-nominalist account of fictitious entities. Both poles of the traditional ontological realism–nominalism dichotomy converge in a thesis according to which what we (mis)take to be really real in truth relies on the subtle participation of abstractions discernible solely via careful theoretical scrutiny. This convergence signals an imperative to sublate the very dichotomy between nominalism and metaphysical realism. This sublation, however, can be achieved only in a materialist way: by thinking objective fictions as the effects of negativity (contradictions and gaps) within reality itself. The present volume's chapters are united in being contributions to the forging of a new theory of objective fictions rising to the challenge of this precise task in the contemporary conjuncture.

Notes

1. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 1969–70*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), p. 66. This peculiar structure of the Other as locus of the inscription of truth is what enables that 'everything of that order, the false, even lies [. . .] only exist on the foundation of truth' (p. 187). This actually repeats Lacan's point made in *Seminar XI* that we can lie/deceive by (half-)saying the truth, as in the famous Jewish joke where one Jew tells another that he is catching the train to Lemberg: 'Why are you telling me you are going to Lemberg, the other replies, since

you really are going there, and that, if you are telling me this, it is so that I shall think that you are going to Cracow?' (Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 139.

2. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1976), p. 280.

3. Marx, *Capital, Volume One*, pp. 758–9.

4. Marx, *Capital, Volume One*, p. 759.

5. Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology*, trans. Martin Sohn-Rethel (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 6–8, 17, 20–1, 28–9, 57, 60–1, 74, 77–8.

6. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State*, *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Penguin, 1975), p. 161; Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973), pp. 85, 88, 100–2, 104–5, 142–6, 157, 164, 331, 449–50, 831–2; Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Maurice Dobb, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya (New York: International, 1970), pp. 30–1, 49; Marx, *Capital, Volume One*, pp. 739, 909; Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Two*, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1992), p. 185; Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three*, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1981), pp. 275, 596–7, 603.

7. Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 85–8.

8. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21.42 (p. 37).

9. Lacan, *Seminar XVII*, pp. 14–55.

10. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–60*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 242; Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre XVI: D'un Autre à l'autre, 1968–69*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006), p. 190; Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore, 1972–73*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), pp. 3, 58.

11. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–55*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), p. 9.

12. Lacan, *Séminaire XVI*, p. 190.

13. Jeremy Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, in C. K. Ogden, *Bentham's Theory of Fictions* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 19.

14. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, pp. 20–1.

15. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 50.

16. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 51.

17. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 134.

18. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 118.

19. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, p. 12; Lacan, *Séminaire XVI*, p. 190.

20. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, p. 12.

21. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 15.

22. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 73.

23. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 137.

24. Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative*, p. 87.

25. Lacan, *Seminar XX*, p. 118.

26. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, p. 228.

27. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, p. 118.

28. Lacan, *Seminar XVII*, pp. 12–13; Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: . . . or Worse, 1971–72*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. A. R. Price (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), pp. 30, 131–3, 205; Lacan, *Seminar XX*, pp. 17, 30, 54; Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre XXI: Les non-dupes errent, 1973–74* (unpublished typescript), 12/11/73, 1/15/74, 4/9/74, 5/21/74.

29. Bentham, *The Theory of Fictions*, pp. 141–50.

30. Lacan, *Séminaire XVI*, p. 179.

31. Oscar Bloch and Walther von Wartburg, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2016, 4ᵉ tirage), p. 352.

32. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and Its Interpretation, 1958–59*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (Cambridge: Polity, 2019), p. 105.

33. Lacan, *Seminar XI*, p. 163.

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